Abstract. It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but ω-consistency is less frequently required. This paper argues that ω-consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting ω-inconsistent truth theories for arithmetic is unsatisfiability. In order to bring out this point, well known ω-inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories.
symbols for primitive recursive functions that will be needed. L 2 T obtains from L 2 by adding a new monadic predicate letter T for truth.
Let N 2 be the intended model of L 2 , and let ω be its first-order domain. N 2 interprets the constant 0 with the number 0, s with the successor function and other primitive recursive function symbols in the intended way. By 'standard' or 'intended model of L 2 T ' we mean any second-order interpretation of this language whose restriction to L 2 is isomorphic to N 2 .
Shapiro has recently argued that unintended interpretations of first-order arithmetic demonstrate that first-order languages are inadequate for axiomatizing arithmetic. 4 He maintains that arithmetic should be formulated in a language whose resources transcend first-order logic. He proposes that second-order languages provide a suitable framework. Second-order languages contain not just first-order quantifiers that range over elements of the domain, but also second-order quantifiers that range over subsets of the domain. In full second-order logic, it is crucial that these second-order quantifiers range over all subsets of the domain.
Thus, by 'second-order interpretation' or 'second-order model' we understand any classical interpretation of a second-order language as L 2 where the second-order domain is the power set of the first-order domain. If we did not limit ourselves to standard semantics we would not be really working with second-order languages but just with multi-sorted first-order ones.
Let P A 2 be the usual recursive axiomatization of second-order arithmetic. It contains the usual axioms of first-order arithmetic plus the second-order formulation of induction instead of the first-order induction schema. If the principles of arithmetic are formulated in a second-order language, then Dedekind's argument goes through and we have a categorical theory.
L 2 T contains a termn-the numeral of n-for each n ∈ ω given by n occurrences of s followed by the constant symbol 0. Given any piece of vocabulary A of L 2 T , A denotes the numeral of the Gödel number of A, given some fixed coding.
The sets of atomic and true atomic sentences of L 2 are recursive, as well as the set of L 2 T -sentences, the set of first-order variables, the set of second-order variables and the set of predicate letters. They will be represented in P A 2 -and thus expressed in N 2 -by At (x), V er(x), Sent (x), var(x), V ar(x) and Pred(x), correspondingly.
The function symbols ¬ . , ∧ . and ∀ . represent recursive functions such that for any formulae A and B, individual variable v and second-order variable V :
ẋ represents the function that maps any number n to the code of its numeraln. Finally, x(y/z) represents the substitution function, which applied to the code x of a formula A and the codes y and z of terms t 1 and t 2 , gives the code of the formula that obtains by replacing t 2 in A with t 1 ; while when applied to the codes y and z of relation symbols or second-order variables of the same arity R 1 and R 2 it gives the code of the formula that obtains by substituting R 2 in A with R 1 . As usual, we write A(v) as short for A(v) (v/ v ) to bind the individual variable v from outside corner quotes. §2. Two ω-inconsistent theories of truth. Friedman & Sheard (1987) , and studied in depth by Halbach (1994 Halbach ( , 2011 . Given a base theory formulated in a classical language containing a predicate T for truth, FS adds axioms and rules governing T to the base theory that are consistent with it and intended to turn T into a truth predicate for the resulting system. FS provides compositionality principles and two rules of introduction and elimination for T that turn it into a symmetric notion: every provable formula of the theory will also be provably true and vice versa.
The complete and consistent theory of truth FS. FS is an axiomatic theory of truth introduced by
Let L 2 T be our classical language and P A 2 T our base theory. We will also refer to the latter as 'F S 2 0 '. F S 2 1 is F S 2 0 plus the following axioms:
(T ¬), (T ∧) and (T ∀v) collaborate to establish the compositional character of truth. One might expect (T ∀V ) to do its part, that is to state that T commutes with the secondorder universal quantifier too. Such a principle, for instance, would require ∀X A to be true whenever each formula that results from replacing all free occurrences of X in A with a monadic predicate symbol is true. But there cannot be enough predicate symbols in L 2
T is a denumerable language; it may happen that all instances of A(X ) are true, while its universal closure is not. 5 (T ∀V ) states only the other direction, which is sound: if the universal closure of A(X ) is true, then the result of replacing X with a predicate letter of the same arity is true too.
Finally, let F S 2 be F S 2 1 plus the following inference rules:
F S 2 is an ω-inconsistent system, that is, for some formula A(x) with only one free individual variable x, F S 2 A(n) for each n ∈ ω and, at the same time, F S 2 ¬∀x A(x). This is an immediate consequence of a theorem of McGee (1985, p. 399) .
The revision theory of truth T # .
The revision theory of truth is an attempt to show how a classical language may contain its own truth predicate by describing and explaining the behavior of this predicate in ordinary as well as in problematic cases such as those posed by semantic paradoxes. It was originally introduced by Gupta (1982) and Herzberger (1982) and fully developed by Gupta & Belnap (1993) , the locus classicus on the topic. The revision theory is said to be a semantic truth theory. But despite working with a class of models for the language whose truth predicate is to be explained, it does not provide a class of models for the language but instead provides a class of sentences intended to be the ones that are categorically assertible.
Let L 2 T be the language under investigation. The revision theory works as follows. A partial interpretation of L 2 T that just leaves T uninterpreted must be fixed to begin with: the base model. Let N 2 be our base model. Then a hypothetical extension S 0 ⊆ ω for T must be chosen and N 2 expanded to a full second-order model
T with the same first-order domain, 6 that interprets T with S and every other nonlogical symbol of L 2 T with the same objects as N 2 . Now a revision process of the chosen hypothesis begins. (N 2 , S 0 ) is transformed into another model (N 2 , S 1 ), and this one into another, etc. obtaining a sequence of interpretations indexed by ordinal numbers of length On. 7 We use greek letters α, β, λ to denote ordinals. Let A be any sentence of L 2 T . At each successor step α + 1 the extension of the truth predicate is given by the following rule:
Only sentences that are true in the previous level fall inside the extension of the truth predicate. At limit levels things get more complicated. Clearly, results obtained in previous stages must be collected: those sentences stabilized inside the extension of T must remain there, and the same for sentences stabilized outside the extension of the truth predicate. What about unstable sentences? Gupta & Belnap (1993) consider all possible ways of adding some unstable sentences to the extension of T at each limit stage λ. 9 Let A be any sentence of L 2 T and λ any subset of ω:
Different choices of the initial hypothesis S 0 and the extension of λ at each limit stage λ give rise to different revision sequences. To prevent arbitrary choices from slanting the process, every possible sequence with N 2 as base model must be considered. Sentences that stabilize in some way inside the extension of T in every revision sequence will be categorically true and assertible, while the ones that stabilize outside the extension will be categorically false and their negations will be assertible.
In T # categorical statements must be nearly stable. 10 An L 2 T -sentence A is nearly-stably true in a sequence generated by (N 2 , S 0 ) if and only if for every stage β after some stage α there is a natural number n such that for all natural numbers m ≥ n, A ∈ S β+m : and similarly for nearly-stably false sentences. Nearly stable sentences are allowed to fluctuate all along sequences, but those fluctuations must be confined to finite regions immediately after limit ordinals.
An L 2 T -sentence A is valid in T # in N 2 -T # N 2 for short-if and only if it is nearly stably true in every sequence based on N 2 . 6 And thus the second-order domain remains intact too. 7 The class of all ordinal numbers. 8 Actually, codes of sentences rather than sentences themselves belong to each S α . However, for readability purposes we will frequently identify expressions with their codes. 9 Previously, some alternatives have been explored in the literature by Belnap (1982) , Gupta (1982) and Herzberger (1982) , for which Gupta & Belnap (1993) notion seems to be an improvement. Later, Yaqūb (1993) and Chapuis (1996) worked on several refinements. 10 Gupta and Belnap present three diverse systems built around different ways a sentence may stabilize in a sequence, one of which is T # . For a detailed exposition see Gupta & Belnap (1993, chap. 6 ). Gupta & Belnap (1993, p. 225) prove that T # in N -the standard model of first-order arithmetic-is ω-inconsistent, for it satisfies the hypothesis of a theorem of McGee (1985) . Since T # N 2 is an extension of that system, it is ω-inconsistent too. In fact, F S 2 is nearlystably true and, thus, a subtheory of T # N 2 . 11 So T # N 2 is a system of both compositional and symmetric truth too. §3. Some relevant results. Dedekind's categoricity result states that any structures satisfying the axioms of second-order arithmetic are isomorphic. Philosophers of mathematics-for example Shapiro, Isaacson-have repeatedly claimed that this result has significant implications with respect to the determinacy of our understanding of the natural numbers. In the second-order case ω-inconsistency entails unsatisfiability. Both T # N 2 and F S 2 lack models. THEOREM 3.1. F S 2 has no (full) models.
Proof. Suppose for reductio that M F S 2 . As F S 2 is ω-inconsistent, there is a formula A(x) with exactly one free individual variable x such that M A(n) for each n ∈ ω and also M ¬∀x A(x). Since F S 2 extends P A 2 , M P A 2 . Then, by categoricity, 12 M must be an ω-model. Thus, M ∀x A(x) too, which is impossible.
COROLLARY 3.2. The set of L 2 T -sentences that are valid in T # N 2 has no (full) models.
Proof. By theorem 3.1, since F S 2 is a subsystem of T # N 2 .
These are definitively negative results. The lack of models for F S 2 implies, in the first place, that the nonlogical vocabulary of F S 2 cannot be interpreted in any way. Thus, F S 2 'talks' about nothing, neither true statements nor natural numbers. In a sense, this turns it into a useless theory. In the second place, the lack of models shows that this formal system semantically entails everything, it is semantically trivial. One might feel inclined to believe that as a result of being unsatisfiable F S 2 is also inconsistent. However, as is well known, Theorem 3.1 does not entail that F S 2 is inconsistent, for there is no complete secondorder calculus and what happens at the semantic level may carry no proof-theoretical consequences. In fact, F S 2 is consistent and even arithmetically sound, that is, it proves only true L 2 -statements.
Let F S 2 n be F S 2 1 plus at most n − 1 applications of (NEC) and n − 1 applications of (CONEC). We will show that, for each n ∈ ω, F S 2 n has an ω-model. 13 Since every theorem of F S 2 must be provable in some F S 2 n , F S 2 must be consistent and arithmetically sound. First we will prove an auxiliary lemma. LEMMA 3.3. Let n ∈ ω and A be any formula of L 2 T . If A is true in the n-th step of every revision sequence based on N 2 then it is also true at stage n + 1.
11 Gupta & Belnap (1993, p. 222) prove that first-order versions of (T ¬), (T ∧) and (T ∀v) are valid in T # in N . The proof for (AT ), (T ¬), (T ∧), (T ∀v) and (T ∀V ) in T # N 2 is analogous. Of course, since the latter entails every true-in-N 2 L 2 -sentence, it is not axiomatizable. F S 2 can only be seen as a partial axiomatization. 12 Dedekind (1996) proved a categoricity result for P A 2 : any model of P A 2 is isomorphic to N 2 and, thus, an ω-model.
Proof. Consider a revision sequence generated by S 0 . Then, (N 2 , S n ) A. Consider now the sequence generated by S 1 instead. The n-th step of the latter sequence is (N 2 , S n+1 ). Thus, (N 2 , S n+1 ) A.
0 is P A 2 T and the latter contains just logical axioms and rules for T , any extension of N 2 to L 2 T satisfies it. Thus, (N 2 , S 0 ) F S 2 0 . We will prove the remaining cases by induction on n with n = 1 as our base step. By the last paragraph, (N 2 , S 1 ) F S 2 0 . We need to show that (AT ), (T ¬), (T ∧), (T ∀v) and (T ∀V ) are also true in (N 2 , S 1 ). We will explicitly prove that (T ¬) and (T ∀V ) are satisfied. Other cases are treated in a similar way.
Suppose for reductio that (
T such that ¬A ∈ S 1 and A ∈ S 1 , or ¬A / ∈ S 1 and A / ∈ S 1 . By (1), we have that either
Similarly, assume that (
Then, there is a second-order variable V , predicate symbol P of the same arity as V and a formula A with possibly V as its only free variable such that ∀V A ∈ S 1 and A(P) / ∈ S 1 . By (1), (N 2 , S 0 ) ∀V A ∧ ¬A(P), which is impossible. Now suppose that (N 2 , S n ) F S 2 n , that is, that F S 2 n is true in the n-th step of every revision sequence based on N 2 . By (3.3), (N 2 , S n+1 ) F S 2 n too. So (N 2 , S n+1 ) validates n − 1 applications of (NEC) and (CONEC). Finally we need to prove that (N 2 , S n+1 ) validates one more application of each rule. Let A be an
n is true at stage n of every revision sequence for L 2 T based on N 2 , no matter what initial hypothesis we have chosen.
COROLLARY 3.5. F S 2 is consistent. COROLLARY 3.6. F S 2 is arithmetically sound.
While Theorem 3.1 shows that F S 2 is trivial from a semantic standpoint, Corollary 3.5 keeps it safe from proof-theoretic trivialization and Corollary 3.6 from arithmetical falsity. The failure of completeness for second-order systems allows these differences between the semantics and the calculus. Nonetheless, consistency and soundness are not enough; ω-consistency is necessary for a theory of truth.
Adding a truth predicate to some base theory should not interfere with the ontology of that theory. First, it does not make much sense to talk about the truth or falsity of uninterpreted formulae. We want sentences such as '¬∃x(s(x) = 0)' to come out true in our truth theories because they say something true about natural numbers, because they are true of the standard interpretation of the language we are working with. Although F S 2 entails many of these sentences and also their truth predication, it cannot be seen as expressing the truth of a sentence that concerns natural numbers (or anything at all), since F S 2 can be no longer seen as saying something true about ω.
Second, one might expect a truth theory to provide a better understanding of the standard interpretation of the base language. But despite being arithmetically sound and proving more true-in-N 2 formulae than P A 2 , including the Gödel sentence and the consistency statement for P A 2 , F S 2 does not provide a better characterization of N 2 since it is not true in it.
Then, as a consequence of Theorem 3.1-which is itself a consequence of the ω-inconsistency of F S 2 -the truth predicate of F S 2 is not a legitimate truth predicate for arithmetic, not even a partial one.
A good theory of truth over arithmetic should not only be arithmetically sound and entail as many intuitive truth principles as possible, but it should also not imply counterintuitive statements involving truth. Consider the following L 2 T -sentence:
where Bew F S 2 is the provability predicate for F S 2 , weakly representable in this system. R F L F S 2 is a global reflection principle for F S 2 : it states that all F S 2 -theorems are true (as long as T is capable of expressing truth, at least partially). This principle seems desirable to anyone embracing F S 2 , for it establishes its soundness. Moreover, it appears to be true according to F S 2 itself since, by (NEC), T applies to every theorem of F S 2 .
However, F S 2 proves the negation and falsity of R F L F S 2 . 14 ¬R F L F S 2 is a highly counterintuitive principle but-worst of all-it is strictly false. Although F S 2 does not prove any arithmetically false statement, it entails incorrect truth-theoretical principles. F S 2 is arithmetically but not truth-theoretically sound.
As a consequence, supporters of F S 2 must regard their own theory as unsound, for they fall into the following dilemma: they commit themselves either to the falsity or to the truth of R F L F S 2 . The first alternative seems reasonable, for ¬R F L F S is entailed both by F S 2 and T # N 2 . But this formula states the unsoundness of F S 2 . The second choice also seems attractive, since R F L F S 2 states the soundness of F S 2 . However, since F S 2 implies the negation of that principle, supporters are forced to admit that their theories entail falsities and, hence, are unsound.
Naturally, whatever is provable in F S 2 must be provable by a finite number of applications of (NEC) and (CONEC). As a result, every F S 2 -theorem is a theorem of an ω-consistent fragment of F S 2 . ω-inconsistency is not the reason why F S 2 proves the negation of its own reflection principle, but rather why this negation is false according to the theory itself. For while a finiteness argument goes through and, thus, ¬R F L F S 2 is provable in some ω-consistent fragment of F S 2 , R F L F S 2 only becomes true-and its negation false-when applications of (NEC) are unrestrained. In fact, F S 2 entails T A whenever it entails Bew F S 2 ( A ) for each L 2 T -sentence A and, at the same time,
Regarding T # N 2 , things get murkier. This truth theory provides a class of L 2 T -sentences that are supposed to be correctly assertible. Gupta & Belnap (1993, p. 219) show that this set is closed under classical logical consequence, for logical truths are true and logical rules are sound in every model, including all extensions of N 2 . Since the set of T # N 2 -valid sentences lacks models we have that T # N 2 entails every L 2 T -statement. In Theorem 3.2 we show that T # is fully incapable of dealing with truth for second-order arithmetic. According to T # every sentence of L 2 T is correctly assertible, and so we get absolute triviality. §4. Conclusions. As is widely accepted, ω-inconsistent theories of truth for first-order arithmetic are undesirable, for they do not succeed in expressing genuine truth. Results for the second-order case are worse and completely decisive. Higher-order resources with standard semantics ban the existence of nonstandard models. Thus, ω-inconsistency entails unsatisfiable theories of truth, that is, semantically trivial systems. While F S 2 , by an incompleteness result, avoids trivialization at the proof-theoretical level, T # N 2 has the further flaw of entailing every sentence, rendering it completely useless as a semantic theory of truth.
In sum, ω-consistency is a highly desirable feature for a theory intended to provide a truth predicate for first-order arithmetic; but it becomes indispensable if the aim is to give a truth predicate for second-order arithmetic. §5. Acknowledgments. We owe thanks to Roy Cook, Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb and Øystein Linnebo for very helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. Earlier versions of this material were presented at conferences in MCMP-Munich, University of Oxford, the Logic Research Group of the University of Buenos Aires and Sadaf. We are grateful to the members of these audiences for their valuable feedback.
